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This book aims at establishing a view of understanding that will be free of ties to the "cultural 
imperialism" and "scientific-technological reduction ism" which the author sees as threatening 
the prospects for human freedom and dignity. In the course of this attempt he surveys a wide 
variety of anthropological, literary, and philosophical material, always focusing on those aspects 
of the subject matter that suggest the limitations of a scientistic world-view. It comes as 
something of a surprise when the attack on scientism and the praise of the rich diversity of many 
cultural traditions turns out to be the prelude to the intro duction of a modified analogical theory 
based on the Thomistic tradition. The perspective which is eventually outlined seems very close 
to that of Paul Ricoeur's defense of analogy, from a phenomenological point of view, in The 
Rule of Metaphor. Unlike Ricoeur, however, Madison does not engage thinkers like Heidegger 
and Derrida at a deep level; he prefers a broad survey of many subject matters to the more 
concentrated studies of Ricoeur on specific subjects such as metaphor. After stating some general 
objections to scientism and to the project of an ideal language, Madison devotes two chapters (2 
and 3) to a discussion of anthropological hermeneutics. Drawing on a wide variety of sources, he 
makes clear the dangers involved in assimilating the practices and beliefs of different cultures to 
those of our own. Yet just as he rejects the position of the dogmatist who would impose a single 
grid on the world's cultural diversity, Madison also wants to differentiate his view from that of 
extreme cultural relativism. I am not sure that this latter effort is successful. Here Madison 
introduces the analogical perspective (chapter 4). According to his version of it, every culture, in 
so far as it has a system of beliefs, aims at a reality which is the object of those beliefs. This 
reality, however, is culturally relative and is not to be confused with (genuine) Reality. The 
latter, as Madison agrees with traditional analogical theory, is strictly unknowable by human 
beings. What we can know are the individual cultures themselves and the general relationship 
which obtains between belief-systems and realities (as objects of belief). So Madison can say 
with Nietzsche "that all knowledge is perspectival" while affirming that "Reality transcends all 
cultures or languages" (p. 146). Whereas traditional analogical theory is usually concerned to con 
struct or discern the best possible analogies for understanding what there really is, Madison's 
version is quite skeptical. He generally refuses to make any cognitive comparisons between 
different cultures or world-views and devotes one chapter (8) to a sympathetic exposition of the 
classical skepticism of Sextus Empiricus, claiming that skeptical ataraxia is more or less identical 
with human wisdom. This skeptical move reinforces the tendency toward cultural relativism. In 
the an thropological chapters Madison argues at some length that magic and science are similar 
belief-systems (or parts of such systems) since neither can be falsified for its believers by a 
single anomalous event or experiment. Throughout there is the assumption that belief-systems 
are holistic, that every culture has one and only one, and that each sees the world as a unity. In a 
book which spends a great deal of time canvassing various approaches to interpretation, it is sur 
prising that no attention is given to a perspective like Foucault's (or Marx's for that matter) which 
stresses the discontinuities (or internal contradictions in Marx's case) within a single culture. One 
also misses (perhaps especially as an American reader) an account of a culture which is itself 
mixed and pluralistic rather than tightly unified; or, if a pluralistic culture is a contradiction in 
terms, it would be interesting to know whether Madison would draw the conclusion (as some 
Heideggerians have done) that we do not live in a world. In two chapters on metaphor (6 and 7), 
Madison surveys and dis cusses the views of Saussure, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Wheelwright, Ein 
stein, and Koestler (among others) on language and creativity. Here he defends several 
"unpopular" positions in philosophy, such as taking the side of the sophists in their quarrel with 
Plato and of Cardinal Bellarmine in the church's conflict with Galileo. Especially in the last case 
his treatment is illuminating, suggesting that Galileo was the dogmatist while Bellarmine was 
upholding the modernist claim that no set of experiences ever uniquely determines a scientific 
theory. In general, one of the strongest points of the book is its determination to show that the 
theory of understanding which it develops can help to clarify a number of concrete questions, 
both contemporary and historical, about the limits and possibilities of our understanding of 
history, science, and creative language. However, the argument is often repetitive; there are too 
many unnecessary summaries of what has already been said. The book will probably be of 
greatest value for those who are already inclined toward its general position and are interested in 
the illustrative material; it may also have some use as a textbook for advanced undergraduates or 
as an outline of what the author calls the "non-dogmatist," "non-rationalist" point of view for 
anthropologists or sociologists who have begun to reflect on the foundation of their disciplines. 
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